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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OP UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

V.

:

FRANKLIN BUTLER,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 960029-CA

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from nonjury convictions of aggravated
robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-302 (1995); and aggravated kidnapping, a first degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1995).
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW

Did the trial court properly admit testimony concerning
statements made by a coconspirator as non-hearsay under rule
801(d)(2)(E), Utah Rules of Evidence?
Although the admissibility of evidence is a question of
law subject to the "correctness" standard of review, when the

court's legal analysis is contingent upon the resolution of a
predicate factual issue, the "correctness" standard of review
necessarily incorporates a "clearly erroneous" standard for
review of the subsidiary factual determination.
Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 781 n.3 (Utah 1991).

State v.

In order to resolve

the question of whether the challenged testimony was admissible
as nonhearsay, the trial court was required to determine whether
the defendant and the coconspirator participated in a criminal
joint venture, a subsidiary factual determination reviewed under
the highly deferential "clearly erroneous" standard.

See State

v. Gray. 717 P.2d 1313, 1318 (Utah 1986).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issue presented on
appeal is contained in or appended to this brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with aggravated
robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-302 (1995); and aggravated kidnapping, a first degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1995) (R. 12).

Defendant waived a jury trial, and the case was tried to the

bench on July 27, 1995 (R. 13, 21-22).
2

The judge found defendant

guilty as charged, and, on September 6, 1995, sentenced him to
serve two concurrent terms of five-years-to-life in the Utah
State Prison (R. 28-29, 30-31).

Defendant appeals, challenging

the trial court's admission of evidence under rule 801, Utah
Rules of Evidence.

STATEMENT Q? FACTS
At 1:00 a.m. on Sunday, May 14, 1995, Audrey Jenkins,
her friend Lydia, and Audrey's boyfriend Etie Kabwasa, were
sitting on the floor in an upstairs room of Audrey's Ogden
apartment talking (R. 60-65, 105). Suddenly, James wBo" Robinson
burst into the room, followed by defendant, Franklin Butler (R.
63, 105-06).

Bo brandished a knife and demanded money from Etie

(R. 72, 106) . Etie repeatedly denied having any money, prompting
Bo to say, *I know you have got some money, that's why we came
over here because I knew you had some money" (R. 73, 76), and nI
know you do because somebody saw you down at the [American]
Legion and said you were spending money" (R. 72). Defendant
added, "if you don't give [us] the money, we are going to teach
you a lesson" (R. 106-07).

Etie continued to claim he had no

money, but neither defendant nor Bo believed him (R. 73, 75-76,
106-07).

3

Lydia asked defendant if she could leave because she
had left several children in her apartment next door (R. 73,
107).

Defendant let Lydia leave, but refused to let Audrey leave

(R. 74-75, 107)• Bo then started the first of three beatings
Etie would receive that morning, while defendant watched and kept
Audrey in the room (R. 75-76, 107). Finally, Etie confessed that
there was money in his jacket and begged them to let Audrey go
downstairs to get it (R. 76, 108). When Audrey returned, she gave
the jacket to defendant, who searched through the pockets, but
found no money (R, 76-77, 109-110).

Etie broke down and gave

defendant all the money he had in his pocket, but it was not
enough, and the beating continued (R. 109, 111-12).
Bo continued hitting Etie, periodically brandishing the
knife (R. 77, 107-08, 110-11).

When defendant began to move away

from the door, Audrey bolted from the room and went to Lydia's
apartment where her children were staying (R. 77, 110).
Defendant did not follow her, but instead joined Bo in beating up
Etie (R. 77, 110).
Eventually, Bo made his way to Lydia's apartment,
followed by defendant and Etie (R. 77-78, 98, 111). The demands
for money continued, and Etie insisted that he had none (R. 78).
Bo told Etie, *I am not leaving until you give me moneyt,]" and
4

ultimately told him, "well, you had better find a way to get it.*
(R. 78-79).

Etie finally decided that he might be able to borrow

some money if he could make a phone call (R. 78, 99, 112).
Neither Lydia nor Audrey had a phone, so the call had to be made
from a pay phone (R. 100).
Bo agreed to the call, and he, defendant and Etie left
the apartment (R. 79, 113). Once outside, the second beating
began (R. 79, 113). Defendant and Bo pinned Etie against a car
and beat him, then defendant hit him across the ribs with a board
(R. 80, 114). Audrey's screams stopped the beating (R. 114), and
the group headed for defendant's car, with Bo forcing Audrey to
go along (R. 80). When Audrey suggested a place with a phone,
defendant, who was driving, snapped, WI am going to take you
right the fuck where I want to go" and drove them to a location
of his choosing (R. 81).
Once at the phone, defendant and Audrey disagreed on
who would make the call. Defendant insisted that Audrey make the
call, while Audrey insisted that only Etie could get money from
his friend, Harry (R. 81-83).

Audrey helped Etie from the car

because he was dizzy, unsteady, and bleeding from the mouth (R.
82)•

Defendant supplied the money for the phone call, but when

Etie started to dial, defendant grabbed the receiver from him,
5

saying, "you ain't dialing shit, let her dial it" and *[y]ou
could be calling anybody." (R. 82-83, 115). Audrey ultimately
spoke with Harry, begging him to help Etie or "they" would kill
him (R. 84, 100, 116, 144).
In the meantime, Etie had started back towards the car
(R. 84). Defendant and Bo started beating him for the third time
(R. 84-85, 115). Etie was on the ground when defendant picked up
a post, "drew back" and hit Etie once "hard" on the left side of
his upper body, knocking Etie unconscious (R. 84-86, 115-16).
Defendant grabbed Etie, pulled him to his feet, and started
punching him again (R. 115-16).

At one point, defendant told Bo,

"man[,] we should have shot him anyway, get him over with [sic]."
(R. 116).
By the time Audrey finished the phone call, all three
men were back in defendant's car (R. 86). She explained to them
that Harry would help, but they would have to go to Layton
because Harry would not come to Ogden (R. 86). Although
defendant complained about being a taxi, he drove everyone to
Layton in his car (R. 86-87).
When they arrived at Harry's apartment, Audrey got out
to meet Harry, and Bo followed her (R. 88-89).

Harry gave Audrey

all his money--$35.00--and, when she said it would not be enough,
6

a sapphire-ruby ring he believed to be worth more than $400.00
(R. 88, 144-45, 149). Audrey gave the money and the ring to Bo,
who cussed, nThis is nothing.

This is not worth $500.00. I

don't want this shit." (R. 89). Frank pulled his car from the
parking lot closer to where Bo stood, Bo got in, and the two men
took off, leaving Audrey and Etie behind (R. 89, 146). Both
Harry and Marie, the woman who picked defendant up after the
assault, testified that Etie "was a mess" (R. 140-41, 146).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGT7MFNT
Defendant's claim that the State's alleged failure to
establish the existence of a criminal conspiracy rendered certain
evidence inadmissible has no basis in the law of this
jurisdiction.

The law is clear that in order to admit statements

made by a coconspirator in a trial pursuant to rule 801(d)(2)(E),
Utah Rules of Evidence, the State need not establish criminal
conspiracy as charged in Utah Code Ann. 76-4-20 (1995).
Gray. 717 P.2d 1313, 1318.

State v.

Instead, the State must prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that a criminal joint enterprise
existed, and that both defendant and the coconspirator were
involved,

id.

Because the evidence clearly establishes these

points, as well as the fact that the statements were made in
furtherance of a criminal venture, the trial court properly
7

admitted the testimony, and defendant's claim on appeal must
fail.

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED THE STATEMENTS OF A
COCONSPIRATOR AS NONHEARSAY UNDER RULE 801(D)(2)(E), UTAH
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, WHERE THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED,
BEYOND A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE, THAT DEFENDANT AND
HIS CODEFENDANT WERE INVOLVED IN A CRIMINAL VENTURE AND THAT
THE STATEMENTS WERE MADE IN FURTHERANCE OF THAT VENTURE
During the direct examination of its first witness at
trial, the prosecution sought to elicit testimony concerning
statements made by James *Bo" Robinson during the course of the
robbery and kidnapping (R. 66).

Addendum A.

Defendant objected,

arguing that the testimony was inadmissible hearsay and that the
State was unable to make the prerequisite showing of a criminal
conspiracy (R. 67-71).

Addendum A.

The trial court recessed to

enable counsel to obtain legal authority, heard argument from
both sides, then permitted the admission of the testimony
provisioned on the prosecutor's ability to establish the
requisite points in the course of the trial (R. 70-71).

Addendum

A.
After the parties rested, the court revisited the
issue, ultimately finding the evidence admissible (R. 22, 155).

8

Addendum B. After quoting from State v. Gray. 717 P.2d 1313 (Utah
1986)/ the court stated:
In this case, I believe that the State has
established certainly by a preponderance of the
evidence the involvement of this defendant in the
criminal venture. And therefore I admitted
provisionally the statements of the co-conspirator.
And I am now ruling that those statements are
admissible as co-conspirators in the commission of this
crime [sic]. And I think the State's argument is well
taken that it is obvious when you have an aiding and
abetting situation that you -- the example he used the
bank robbery, someone waiting outside as a driver. The
Court cannot imagine that the statement of the other
participants [#']turn over the money, ["] or ["Jhold your
hands up turn over the money,["] wouldn't be
admissible. Therefore, I think that I am persuaded
these statements are admissible and should come in in
this case.
(R. 155). Addendum B.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in
allowing, as an exception to the hearsay rule, the testimony
concerning Bo's statements.

Br. of App. at 6-10. Specifically,

he argues that, as a prerequisite to admission of the hearsay
under rule 801(d)(2)(E), Utah Rules of Evidence, the State must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of a
criminal conspiracy as it is outlined in Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-20
(1995), which provides the elements for the crime of conspiracy.
Br. of App. at 7. However, defendant's argument misinterprets
the law.

9

Rule 801(d)(2)(E) provides:
(d) Statements which are not hearsay.
hearsay if:
•

A statement is not

• •

(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is
offered against a party and is (A) the party's own
statement, in either an individual or a representative
capacity, or (B) a statement of which the party has
manifested an adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a
statement by a person authorized by the party to make a
statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by
the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within
the scope of the agency or employment, made during the
existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a
coconspirator of a party during the course and in
furtherance of the conspiracy.
In State v. Gray. 717 P.2d 1313 (Utah 1986), upon which
defendant relies, the Utah Supreme Court expressly stated that,
"although proof of criminal conspiracy [under section 76-4-20]
may be sufficient to support introduction of testimony pursuant
to the [hearsay] exception, it is not necessary for application
of Rule 801(d)(2)(E).*

Id. at 1318. The court not only

acknowledged that there were differences in the proof required to
convict a person of criminal conspiracy and the proof required to
admit evidence pursuant to rule 801(d)(2)(E), but was careful to
explain the difference,

id. at 1317-19.

Under Gray, statements by a coconspirator may be
admitted as nonhearsay under rule 801(d)(2)(E) upon proof by a
preponderance of the evidence, independent and exclusive of the
10

proposed statement(s), that (1) a criminal joint venture existed
in which (2) defendant participated and (3) the coconspirator was
a member.

Gray. 717 P.2d at 1318-19.

Such evidence may be

offered either before or after the coconspirator's statement is
admitted,

id. at 1319.

The trial court may consider, among

other things, defendant's own statements suggesting his
involvement in the conspiracy or joint venture, as well as
actions by either the defendant or the coconspirator,

id.

Finally, the challenged statement(s) must have been made during
the course of, or in furtherance of, the criminal venture.

Utah

R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E).
Defendant's summary of the evidence does not do justice
to the testimony the trial court obviously believed.
at 8.

Br. of App.

Further, he states that the victim testified that

defendant was unarmed and made no threats or requests for money.
Id. at 9-10.

To the contrary, the victim testified that the

defendant twice used a board to beat him, knocking him
unconscious the second time (R. 114-15); "took a clip of the gun
behind a chair and put [it] in" (R. 130); told the victim nif you

11

don't give [us] the money, we are going to teach you a lesson"
(R. 106-07); and demanded money (R. 106) .x
The evidence in this case readily establishes the
existence of a criminal joint venture and the direct involvement
in the joint venture of both defendant and James "Bo* Robinson.
Defendant and Bo were friends who showed up at Audrey's house
together, remained together throughout the ordeal, and left
together immediately after obtaining the money and the ring,
stranding Etie and Audrey in Layton.

Both defendant and Bo

demanded money from Etie as soon as they arrived, then used force
throughout the remainder of the ordeal to obtain it.

Nothing in

the evidence suggests any other reason for defendant and Bo to be
present except to further their demand for money.

Shortly after

arriving at Audrey's, Frank told Etie, "if you don't give [us]
the money, we are going to teach you a lesson", following which
the first of three severe beatings began (R. 106-07).
Both defendant and Bo participated in beating Etie in
Audrey's apartment, in front of Lydia's apartment, and at the pay

'Defendant's brief also suggests that the kidnapping charge
related to Audrey. Br. of App. at 9 (defendant "was not even
present when the alleged kidnapping of Audrey took place"). The
State never alleged or argued that defendant kidnapped Audrey.
The kidnapping charge related solely to Etie, and it was on that
basis the trial court found him guilty (R. 2, 161).

12

phone.

While Bo was the one who wielded the knife and took the

money from Harry, defendant was present throughout the ordeal,
took the money Etie had on him, acted in support of Bo's demands,
and never tried to help the victim or otherwise separate himself
from Bo's actions and statements. When he was not actively
hitting Etie with his fists or with boards, he was present while
Bo delivered the beating.

He facilitated the first beating by

actively detaining Audrey while Bo beat up Etie.

He took the

change Etie had on him as well as looked through the jacket
pockets for money he thought would be there.
The pair apparently arrived in defendant's car and used
it to leave once they had gotten Harry's money and ring.
Defendant not only used his car during the ordeal to get to a
phone and ultimately to get the money, but drove it himself,
verbally declaring that he was in charge of where they went by
saying, "I am going to take you right the fuck where I want to
go[,]" ignoring Audrey's suggested location and driving to one of
his own choosing.

He provided the money for the phone call and

dictated who would speak on the phone.
An objective view of this evidence, independent of any
of Bo's statements, makes it more probable than not that

13

defendant and Bo were involved in a criminal venture for purposes
of rule 801(d)(2)(E). fiEax, 717 P.2d at 1320.
Where the criminal joint venture or "conspiracy" is
established, it becomes clear that the coconspirator's
statements--all dealing with getting money from the victim and
making the phone call to get money from his friend--were made in
furtherance of the "conspiracy*, as required by rule
801(d)(2)(E).

Defendant and his companion made their appearance

demanding money from Etie, and left only after they had gotten
some.

Everything in between was aimed at reaching that goal.

Bo's statements--including "Etie, I want your money[,]" "Give me
your money[,]" I know you [have money] because somebody saw you
down at the Legion and said you were spending money[,]" "I know
you have got some money, that's why we came over here because I
knew you had some moneyt,]" "what are you going to do, because I
am not leaving until you give me moneyt, ]" "well, you had better
find a way to get it [the money]"--further that criminal goal.
Accordingly, the trial court properly determined that the State
had met its burden, "certainly by a preponderance of the
evidence!,]" of establishing the prerequisites for admission of
the challenged testimony as nonhearsay under rule 801(d)(2)(E).

14

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reason, the State respectfully
requests that this Court affirm defendant's convictions and
sentences.

NO ORAL ARGUMENT OR PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED
The State does not believe that oral argument would be
beneficial in this case or that a published opinion is warranted
where resolution of the issue will not materially add to existing
case law.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this *2>

day of April, 1996.

JAN GRAHAM

<&?*ta^f
C. LEONARD
Assistant Attorney General

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing Brief of Appellee was mailed by first class mail,
postage prepaid, to Kent E. Snider, Weber County Public
Defender's Association, attorney for appellant, 2568 Washington
Blvd., Suite 203, Ogden, Utah 84401, this <?=)'
1996.
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day of April,

ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A
Trial Transcript (R. 66-71)

1

Q

The three of you?

2

A

Yes, all three of us were up in the room sitting

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

down.
Q

And vas the apartment locked or unlocked downstairs?!

A

The apartment door didn't have a lock on it because

about a month prior to that it vas kicked in. And housing hadj
never fixed the door, because the door vas on order because it]
is a wooden door covered with a steel plate.
special ordered.
Q

So it had to be

And the door hadn't been replaced yet.

So just by pushing on it the door opened, is that

correct?
A

Correct.

Q

All right.

Were these gentlemen here by invitation?

Did you expect either of them?
A

No, I did not expect them at that time. No, I

didn't.

17

Q

All right. And so you look up and you see James

18

Robinson is where you left off I believe, is that correct?
19

A

Correct.

Q

And you refer to him as Bo, is that correct?

A

Yes.

Q

All right. And what vas his appearance and his

20
21
22
23

demeanor?
24

A

His demeanor vas that he meant vhat he said.

Q

Okay. What had he said?

25

21

066

MR. GRAVIS:

Objection, hearsay.

MR. DAROCZI: Well, your Honor, this is-MR. GRAVIS:
on trial.
5

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Statement by a co-defendant.

He is not}

Mr. Butler is on trial. Anything Mr. Robinson

|| says is hearsay.

It is not admissible.

It is not admissible

against Mr. Butler.
MR. DAROCZI: Your Honor, the Rule 801 of the
evidence code specifically address that, statement by coconspirator.

And I am offering it under that section.

MR. GRAVIS:
conspiracy.

Mr. Butler is not charged with

I agree that statements by a co-conspirators are

admissible to prove the conspiracy.
conspiracy.

He is not charged with

There is no charge of conspiracy here.

only admissible to prove the conspiracy.

And it is)

In fact the case law]

also holds that if the Court dismisses the charge of
conspiracy in a case with other charges pending, the Court is
then to instruct the Jury to disregard the hearsay testimony
of the co-defendant as inadmissible.
MR. DAROCZI: As a matter of fact, your Honor, the
cases in the—the three cases that are referred to in the

21

footnotes to rule 801 refer to three cases where the
22

conspirator's statements, similar statements were admitted.
23

In none of the three cases had conspiracy been charged.

But

24

the Court allowed the statements by co-conspirators. They
25

were drug cases. Two of them were drug cases wherein the co22

0C7

defendant's statement had been admitted as a co-conspirator*s
statement under the rule*

And neither is there authority for

the position that counsel takes that a conspiracy in fact has
to be charged for co-conspirator's statements to come in. As
a matter of fact, I have authority to the effect that it does
not have to be charged.
7
8

MR. GRAVIS:

Your Honor, I haven't researched it for]

I quite sometime, but Mr. Daroczi and I tried a conspiracy case
four or five years ago where the conspiracy was dismissed at

to

the end of the prosecution case and requested that specific

11

instruction.

12

issue.

13
14

So I know there is a case, Utah case lav on that]

THE COURT:

Either of you consider briefing this

before you came in?

15

MR. GRAVIS:

I had no—he never filed a motion for-H

16

in limine to allow this. And it is hearsay.

17

position that it is inadmissible.

18
19
20

MR. DAROCZI: Your Honor, counsel has been lying in
wait here.

23
24

He has had the reports, and he knows exactly what

the State's case is about.

21
22

And it is my

THE COURT: Well, without the attack back and forth,
I don't have a brief from either one of you.

Hold on just a

minute, I will take a look at this rule.
MR. GRAVIS:

Your Honor, may I make one further

25

statement?

I had filed a Motion to Sever based upon the
23

058

1 n

Bruton decision, a statements made by the co-defendant being

2

admissible, not admissible against my client.

3

So Mr. Daroczi

II was on notice that I intended t o —

4

THE COURT: The footnote to the rule makes reference!

5
6

to State vs. Gray.

It says to utilize the co-conspirator

7

exception the State must introduce evidence independent and

8

exclusive of the conspirator's hearsay statements themselves

8

9 I and establish by a preponderance of the evidence the existence)
10

of a criminal joint venture and the Defendant's participation

11

therein.

12

in the criminal venture is almost required.

13

have that at this point.
MR. DAROCZI:

14
15

Independent evidence of the Defendant's membership
I don't believe l|

If the Court will take this testimony

subject to that, we certainly~our position is that—
THE COURT:

16

I am not very comfortable in doing that.

17

I am the trier of the fact here.

18

objection at this point

I am going to sustain the

MR. DAROCZI: Your Honor, we cannot proceed then

19
20

further unless the Court takes it.

I have authority to the

21

effect that the Court can consider that statement and then

22

analyze it, take the testimony subject to that requirement.

23

Because otherwise the Court cannot hear the facts of this

24

case. The statements—most of the statements are made by Bo

25

Robinson.

Most of the threats. As a matter of fact, most of

the violence is committed by Bo Robinson against the victim.
24
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1

And our secondary position is that the Defendant is

2

secondarily aiding and abetting, aiding and abetting in a

3

crime.

4
5

So by virtue of that, if the Court excludes the

statements, the evidence will not—the trier of the facts
cannot hear a full story.

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

THE COURT:
question.

And let's note for the record here that there is

another matter that the Court has had pending this morning.
Is the D'Hulst matter ready to go forward?
What we are going to do is take a recess in the criminal
action.

Counsel, I expect you to go during the recess and

pull up your case authority.

We will spend a few minutes in

my Chambers determining where we are.
You may step down, ma'am.

If you will stay close, you

will be subject to being recalled back to the stand.

Okay?

The criminal matter is in recess. We will go to the case]
of D'Hulst vs. D'Hulst at this time.

18

(Butler case recessed.)

19
20

X think what we should do, let me ask a

THE COURT:
session.

Let our record show that we are back in

The parties are present with counsel. When we last

21

broke, the Court broke to handle another matter that was
22

pending.

And that's been taken care of.

But the Court also

23

asked counsel to look into this question that was on the
24

record previously that had to do with whether this testimony
25

of statements made by Mr. Robinson would be admissible in this
25
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1
2
3

case.
And at this point the Court is going to allow the
statements in. And they will be allowed in provisionally,

4

subject to the State meeting the test for the admissibility of]
5
6

those statements. And that will be determined by the Court
after the testimony is received.

7
8
9
10
It

MR. DAROCZX:

also offering it as non-hearsay.

The State is

As non-hearsay in that it is]

not offered for the truth of the matter asserted therein, but
as an independent--as statements having independent
significance.

12
13

If I may add one thing.

So with that we are ready to proceed.

MR. GRAVIS:

And we are objecting on both grounds.

We agree the Court can provisionally hear the testimony of a

14

co-conspirator.

But if the conspiracy is not proven, the

15

statements would be disregarded.
16

As far as the other argument the State has made, he just
17

brought that up in Chambers, I have not had time to research
18

it. But we are objecting that the statements would still be
19

hearsay.
20

THE COURT: All right. We have noted those
21

objections. Go ahead with your questions.
22

Ma'am, you understand you are still under oath?
23

A

Yes, I do.

24

THE COURT: Okay.
25

Q

Audrey, you were telling us that Bo, James Robinson,
26
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1

referring to where there is no overt act.

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
IS
16
17
18

THE COURT:

Z thought he agreed there was an overt

act.
MR. GRAVIS:

I say there is not an issue there is an1

overt act.
THE COURT:

The Court is going to make its ruling irj

this case.
I believe the case of State vs. Gray, 717 P.2nd 1313 is
applicable here.

Quoting some of the language of that case,

the court in that case, the Supreme Court, stated we
acknowledge the diversion of authority on the subject and hold
today in accordance with the prevailing view that the criminal]
venture and defendant's participation therein must be
established by a preponderance of the evidence.

When applying!

the standard to determine whether to admit a co-conspirator's
hearsay statements, the court may consider the accused's own
statements indicating his involvement in the conspiracy, as
well as actions by the accused or the declarant.

19
Further, although a conspirator's statements may be
20
provisionally admitted subject to independent proof of the
21
criminal venture and the defendant's participation therein,
22
the Court should make an on the record finding of admission of]
23
it before the case is submitted to the Jury.
24
In this case, I believe that the State has established
25
certainly by a preponderance of the evidence the involvement
109]
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1
2
3

of this defendant in the criminal venture.

And therefore I

admitted provisionally the statements of the co-conspirator.
And I am now ruling that those statements are admissible as

4
co-conspirators in the commission of this crime.
S
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
IS

the State's argument is well taken that it is obvious when yod
have an aiding and abetting situation that you—the example hej
used the bank robbery, someone waiting outside as a driver.
The Court cannot imagine that the statement of the other
participants turn over the money, or hold your hands up turn
over the money, wouldn't be admissible.

Therefore, I think

that I am persuaded these statements are admissible and should]
come in in this case.
So that's my ruling, and the evidence is allowed.
Now, as to the question of the ultimate guilt or
innocence of the Defendant, do you want to speak to that?

16
17

And I think

MR. DAROCZI:

We will submit it, your Honor.

I

might reply if counsel wishes to make an argument.

18
MR. GRAVIS:

I will be very brief, your honor.

You

19
have heard all the evidence.

I submit that the case rests on

20
the credibility of the witnesses.

The Court has heard the

21
testimony.

It is clear that Mr. Kabwasa's statement to

22
Detective Lucas has significantly changed, particularly after
23
he heard Audrey Jenkins testify.

He gave a statement to start)

24
with he was downstairs in the kitchen drinking coffee.

Now hej

25
says we were upstairs in the bedroom.
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